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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintHf and Respon.dent, 
-vs.-
EDGAR GLEN GUDE, 
Defen,dant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 9619 
STATE11ENT OF T'HE KIND OF CASE 
Thris is a criminal case w·herein the defendant was 
charged and convicted of the crime of grand larceny 
for having taken his 1953 Ford Autornobile from the 
possession of Harold's Auto Sales, an auto repair busi-
ness in Ogden, lTtah (R. 7). 
The· case was tried to a JUry, which returned a 
verdict of guilty on N ovmnber 9, 1961, and on November 
13, 1961, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the 
L t.a:h State Prison for a term of not less than one nor 
more than ten years (R. 27). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and sent-
ence. 
ST·ATE11ENT OF FACTS 
On August 16, 1961, the defendant and his friend, 
Garth Walton, towed defendant's Ford automobile to 
Harold's Auto Sales iin order to obtain an estimate of 
the oost of needed repairs. The estimate given for over-
hauling the oar by L. Eugene Seifert, a mechanic em-
ployed by Harold's, was in the neighborhood of $180.00 
(T;r. 96). The defendant left his car at the garage and 
returned to Montana where he was employed. He did 
not return to H·arold's until noon on Septe·mber 20, 1961, 
to inquire whether the repairs on his car had been com-
pleted. At that tune he was presented with the repair 
bill (plaintiff's Exhibit "A"), which totaled $345.97. 
The·re is a dispute in the testimony with respect to 
defendant's reaction when confronted with this bill, but 
in any event, he asked Mr. Pettigrew, an en1ployee at 
Harold's, to leave the car by the garage while he went 
to Salt Lake to get some money owed him by another 
to pay for the car (Tr. 13). Not being able to get the 
money in Salt L·ake, defendant returned to Ogden and 
went to the Friendly Tavern where he met his friend, 
Denny Ma..-x:well, and proceeded to tell him of his predica-
ment. Maxwell indic,ated an interest in buying the car, 
and defendant returned to Harold's to see if he could 
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get permission to bring the car into town to demonstrate 
and possibly sell it to obtain nwney with whieh to pay 
the bill. Defendant arrived at Harold's .at approxnnately 
10:00 p.In., one hour after 1-Iarold's had dosed for the 
night. Finding no one there and assmning he had a 
right to take his own car, defendant drove it from the 
lot (T1·. 68, G9 and 77). J\1r. Pettigrew called the police 
the next morning to report the missing car. 
On Septe~nber 23, 1961, at approxunately 8 :00 a.m., 
officer Judkins of the Ogden City Police D;epartment, 
received a call to go to \V ashington Boulevard and 
Goddard Street to investigate a man who had been 
stopped while driving the 1953 Ford in question. The 
driver of the car was Dennis Maxwell (Tr. 3.3-34). As 
officer Judkins testified, Maxwell claimed to be the 
owner of the car and presented a certificate of registra-
tion and a Montana title to the automobile; however, 
the registration and Montana title were not endorsed 
by the defendant nor signed by the alleged owner (Tr~ 
39, 40, 81). The off[cer took Maxwell down to the Police 
Station .and in the presence of the defendant, who later 
arrived, interrogated Maxwell concerning ownership of 
the car. The State attempted to show through Officer 
Judkins and Officer Wold that defendant had in fact 
sold the car to M.:.axwell for $50.00 and that Maxwell 
told them this in defendant's presence. Defendant being 
confused and feeling that his friend was in trouble did 
not deny this claim (Tr. 36, 37, 43, 44 and 72). J\tlaxweU 
could not be found at time of trial (T'r. 40). 
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D·efendant testified that on the Saturday of Septem-
ber 23rd, in the hall at the Police Station, he had a 
conversation with the complainant's partner (Eugene 
Seifert) and that (Seifert) .agreed that son1e arrange-
ment could be worked out for defendant to pay the bill. 
This conversation took place after the Sergeant said the 
affair was a civil matter and defendant and (Seifert) 
would have to straighten it out (Tr. 72, 73). Defendant 
showed the car to another prospective buyer on the 27th 
of September at the pound (the car was impounded the 
23rd of September due to its Montana license which 
was out of date), but the buyer felt that the offering 
price of $345.00 was too much for the car. When this 
deal fell through complainant's partner (Seifert) who 
was at the pound at the time told defendant "Well, you 
had better get that money today. If you don't, I'm going 
to sign out a complaint against you." (Tr. 74) 
At the trial defendant's counsel, Mr. Raat, called 
defendant to the stand to explain his side of the story 
and asked defendant if he had ever been convicted of 
a felony to which the defendant answered "Yes." De-
fendant testified that the last time he was convicted 
of a felony was in 1952 ( Tr. 61). On cross-exanrination 
Mr. Newey, attorney for the State, asked defendant how 
many times he had been convicted of a felony to which 
defense counsel objected for the reason that it was in-
competent, irrelevant and ilnmaterial to the case~ The 
court allowed the answer and defendant testified that 
he had been convicted of a felony three times. The 
State inquired as to the nature of each felony over 
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dl•l'l'lHlnnt'~ obj<•etion and defendant testified that he had 
been <·onvided of 8tatutory rape and twice for .anned 
roblwr:· (T1·. 75-76). 
~ \ ftl•r thP c:onclusion of the evidence the court In-
:-;tnwte<l the jury a:s follow8: 
"Before you can find the Defendant guilty of 
the offense of grand larceny, as charged in the 
infonnation, the State 1nust prove to your satis-
faction, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following: 
1. r:ehat on or about August 16, 1961, in Weber 
Cotmty, L'tah, the Defendant left with Ha~old's 
_:\uto Sales for repairs his 1953 automobile. 
2. That on or about the 20th day of Septem-
ber, 1961, the Defendant rmnoved said .automobile 
fr·oni the possession of 1Iarold 's Auto Sales with-
out the pennission of said Harold's Auto Sales. 
That the taking away of said autmnobile was done 
·with the "'ilful, unlawful and felonious intent of 
depriving the said Harold's Auto Sales of its right 
as a lien-holder to the possession of said auto-
mobile. 
If you are satisfied frmn all of the evidence 
in this ease, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the 
above enu1nerated fac~ts, then you should return 
a verdict of guilty of g1~and larceny as charged 
against the Defendant. But if there is a reason-
able doubt in your nrinds as to the foregoing facts, 
then you n1ay not convict the Defendant of the 
cri1ne of grand larceny and your verdict must be 
not guilty. 
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'Felonious' Ineans proceeding from an evil 
heart or purpose, done with a deliberate purpose 
to commit a cDime. A n1alicious wrongful act." 
(Tr. 112). 
Defendant objected to this instruction and requested 
the following one which was denied for the reason that 
it had already been covered in another instruction. 
''In theft by larceny, the fe}onious intent that 
I have ment1oned must exist when possession of 
the property is originally obtained by the person 
not entitled thereto, and it is not larceny to 
take property of another through mistake or 
under an honestly entertained claim of owner-
ship or right to possession." (R. 19). 
This appeal is d~rected at the errors committed by 
the trial court in allowing the State to make further 
inquiry into defendant's previous criminal convictions, 
giving an instruction to the jury which asswned that 
certain facts had been established thus taking away from 
the jury its function as the sole judge of the facts of 
the_ case, and for failing to allow defendant's instruction 
which related to defendant's theory of the case and 
defendant's laak of criminal intent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING 
STATE'S COUNSEL TO MAKE FURTHER INQUIRY OF 
THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF DEFENDANT'S PRE-
VIOUS FELONY CONVICTIONS. 
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rrhe case of State v. Parker (1943), 104 Utah 23, 
137 P. :2d 626, established that a person could be guilty 
of larceny by taking his own property from a bailee, 
however, that ease "\vas noted as one which constituted 
an abuse of the crim:inal n1achinery. Considering this 
case within that light, the conduct of the trial court in 
allowing the State's counsel to pursue his inquiry with 
respect to defendant's previous criminal convictions prior 
to the year 1952, defendant's last criminal conviction, 
was an abuse of discretion and prejudiced the jury and 
diverted its attention from the main issue of the cas~. 
The case of State v. Hougensen (1936), 91 Utah 
351, 64 P. 2d 229 at page 238, sets forth principles with 
respect to impeachment of a witness's testimony. Al-
though one of the principles set :Borth states that a 
witness may be asked on cross-examination whether he 
had been convicted of a felony, this is not an absolute 
right and comes within the trial court's discretion after 
it considers the effect of the questions in their tendency 
to prejudice the jury against the defendant or divert 
its attention from the main issue of the case and the 
purpose sought to be accomplished by the impeachment. 
The H ougen~sen case, supra, sets forth this principle 
as follows: 
''While a defendant in a criminal case who 
takes the stand may be cross-examined by counsel 
for the state, as any other witness (section 105-
-±5-5, R.S. 1933), the matter of judicial discretion 
affecting all witnesses under the varying circum-
stances under which each may testify is not af-
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fected by such statute, and as elements in the 
exercise of such discretion, the court should con-
sider the effect of questions in their tendency 
to prejudice the jury against the defendant or 
divert its attention from the main issue or issues 
of the case as weighed against the effect of such 
quest~ons in affecting the credibility of the wit-
ness, keeping in mind that such questions as to 
a defendant 1nay directly prejudice the jury in 
the case, whereas in c.ase of a witness not a 
defendant they do no more than prejudice the 
jury against such witness and thus less directly 
affect the case. State v. Williams, 36 Utah, 273, 
103 P. 250; State v. Vance, supra; State v. Shock-
ley, supra. But we think the matter should be 
left to the sound discretion of the court and do 
not intend to lay down any rule that under no 
circumstances can the defendant like any other 
witness be questioned as to his ·acts, criminal or 
otherwise, in accord with rule 7, which may tend 
to affect his credibility as a witness, subject 
always to the exercise of his personal privilege 
in proper cases." 
In the present case the defendant had already admit-
ted that he had been convicted of a felony; whatever 
effect such admission had on defendant's credibility as 
a witness had already been served. Inquiry into criminal 
convictions prior to 1952 for purpose of further impeach-
ment was so far removed in tilne and in light of the 
admis,sion already made was totally irrelevant and im-
material. The only effect and puTpose of such inquiry 
was to prejudice the jury against the defendant and 
to divert its attention from the main issue of the case. 
Such anquiry should not have been allowed and it con-
stituted a serious abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION TO 
THE JURY CONCERNING THE ELEMENTS OF GRAND 
LARCENY REQUIRED TO BE PROVED BY THE STATE. 
The instruction to which exception is taken is set 
forth at page 112 of the transcript and the Statement 
of F.acts of this brief. The particular portions of said 
instruction which constitute error are as follows: 
''* * * That the taking away of s.aid auto-
ntobile was done with the wilful, unlawful and 
felonious intent of depriving the said Harold's 
Auto Sales of its right as a lien-holder to the 
possession of said automobile.* * * ." 
The court erred by le-aving out of its instruction the 
word "permanently'' pre-ceding the word "depriving." 
Trial counsel objected to this omission (Tr. 119) and 
properly so, because it related to defendant's intent 
and because the omission of the- word "permanently" 
withheld from the jury the defendant's theory of the 
ease that defendant was only taking the- car for the 
limited purpose of finding a buyer so that with the 
proce-eds he would be able- to pay his debt at Harold's 
Auto Sales. A felonious intent is inconsistent with a 
bona fide intent of returning the- property. 32 Am. Jur. 
Section 37, page 928, Wharton'$ Cri1n~nal Law, 12th Ed., 
Vol. 2, Section 1122, p.age 1431. 
The instruction was further rn error be-cause the 
trial court assumed in the instruction that the facts 
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which the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
had already been established. The Court did this in the 
following way: 
"• • * If you are satisfied fron1 all of the 
evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
of the above enumerated facts, then you should 
return a verdict of guilty of grand larceny a.s 
charged .against the D'efendant. But if there is 
a reasonable doubt in your minds as to the fore-
going facts, then you may not convict the De-
fendant of the crime of grand larceny and your 
verdict must be not guilty.***" (Tr. 112) 
The instruction as given was misleading to the 
jury. It assumed that the facts had already been estab-
lished, thus taking away from the jury its function ws 
sole judge of the facts of the case. 
32 Am. Jur. Section 153 at page 1069 sets forth 
the following principle. 
"Instructions.-• • •. An instruction should 
not be given which invades the province of the 
jury to detennine the inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence. Thus, it is reversible error for 
the oourt to .assmne in the instructions that the 
corpus delicti, or any fact necessary to establish 
the guilt of the accused, has been proved, and 
so relieve the jury from its consideration, unless 
the same is expressly or tacitly admitted by the 
defendant." 
In the case of Zediker v. State (1921, Neb.) 184 N. W. 
80, the court held that it was error for the trial court 
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where the oorpus delicti was in dispute, to assume in 
its instnwtion that the corpus delicti was established 
or to refer to it as an established fact even though in 
another instruction the court instructed the jury that 
they were the sole judges of the facts. 
In St.ate v. Green. (1931), 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177 
at p.age 181 the court held: 
" * * * the trial judge is not permitted to com-
rnent on the evidence, much less may he indicate 
to the jury that some rnaterial facts, not admitted 
at the trial, are established beyond controversy. It 
is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to 
deterrnine the facts in all criminal cases * * *. 
The provision of our State Constitution which 
grants .accused persons the ~ight to a trial by 
jury extends to each and all of the facts * * • and 
such right may not be invaded by the presiding 
judge indicating to the jury that any of such 
facts are established by the evidence." 
It is submitted for the foregoing reasons that the 
instruction as given was misleading and erroneous. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFEND-
ANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION. 
53 Am. Jttr. Section 581, page 458 sets forth the 
following prin0iple of law: 
"Ignoring Issues, Theories, or Defenses.-
While the instructions should not go beyond mat-
ters put in issue by the pleadings and supported 
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by the proof, they should cover all the material 
issues thus raised in a case. A court instructing 
the jury may not ignore or withdraw from the 
jury issues of f.act which are in the case and 
supported by evidence, a ground of liability, or 
a proper defense. Nor should it give instructions 
whi~h tend to or do eliminate an issue properly 
before the jury and supported by evidence, or 
exclude from their consideration points which 
are fairly raised by the evidence on either side." 
B~nd v. United States (1901), 180 U. S. 356, 45 L. 
Ed. 570, dealt with an erroneous instruction which omitted 
the defendant's theory of the case of self-defense. The 
pertinent portion of the instruction which was given is 
as follows: 
''The court instructs the jury, if they believe 
frmn the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
* * * that s.aid :killing was not in the necessary 
defense of the defendant's life or to prevent 
the infliction upon him o.f great bodily harm, 
then it is your duty to find the defendant guilty 
,. .. " 
The defendant objected to this instruction because 
it was not qualified by the further charge that 
" '* * * If the defendant believed, and had 
re:ason to believe, that the killing was necessary 
for the defense of his life or to prevent the inflic-
tion upon him of gre·at bodily harm, then he was 
not guilty'. " 
The court stated in finding this to be an erroneous 
instruction : 
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''The question involved * • ·* was .a funda-
mental one in the case; indeed, it may he said 
that the defendant's sole defense rested upon it. 
The defendant, as shown in the bill of exceptions, 
had testified to his own belief that his life was in 
danger, and to the facts that led him so to believe; 
but by the instruction given the jury were left 
to pass upon the vital question without reference 
to the defendant's evidence." 
In the instant case defendant testified that he had 
taken the car for the limited purpose of demonstrating 
it for sale so that he could pay his deht to Harold's 
Auto Sales; that he did not have any intention to perm-
anently deprive Harold's of the value of its lien claim, 
and that defendant thought he had a right to taJke his 
automobile frmn the lot (T'r. 6·9, 81). 
Defendant's refused instruction was the only instruc-
tion which pertained to defendant's theory of the case 
with respect to taking property tmder an honestly enter-
tained claim of ownership or right to its possession. The 
failure of the trial court to grant this instruction de-
prived the jury of an important statement of the law 
which was consistent with defendant's theory of the 
ease. Such a failure was highly prejudicial to defendant 
and constituted error by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Like the Parker case, supra, this case represents an 
abuse of the criminal process. It is apparent from the 
facts that the officers of the Police Department did not 
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believe that a crin1e had been cornn1itted or they would 
have arrested defendant on Saturday, the 23rd day of 
September, when defendant was .at the police station 
with his friend !faxwell. It was not until the 27th day 
of September, after defendant had failed to raise the 
money, that he w.as arrested pursuant to the criminal 
complaint signed by Mr. Pettigrew of Haro1d's Auto 
Sales (R. 1). Failure to pay a debt resulted in defend-
ant's prosecution and conviction. He was also convicted 
because of past felony convictions, because the trial 
court took away from the jury its determination of all 
the facts in the case, and because the trial court refused 
to allow defendant's instruction concerning defendant's 
good faith intent with respect to his own property. In 
the interest of justice the conviction should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. GUSTIN 
1007 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
